The main rebel group in the Niger Delta has announced an “indefinite” ceasefire, boosting hopes that recent government efforts may lead to a reduction of unrest in the region. Many challenges remain, however.
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) announced a new, indefinite ceasefire on October 25th, saying that it had been encouraged by the government’s “readiness to engage” in serious negotiations. MEND, a loose alliance of militant factions that has claimed responsibility for most of the attacks against oil facilities and pipelines since early 2006, announced a 60-day ceasefire (subsequently extended) in mid-July, but had threatened a resumption of attacks unless there were formal talks with the government.
However, MEND appears to have been weakened by Abuja’s 60-day amnesty offer in the Delta region. The amnesty—launched by the Nigerian president, Umaru Yar’Adua, in August in an attempt to end the violence that has cut Nigeria’s oil production by more than 20% since 2006—has largely been deemed a success, with more than 6,000 militants surrendering their arms during the two months, according to the Amnesty Implementation Committee. Although the ex-militants have probably not surrendered all their weapons, and some intransigent rebel factions have not accepted the amnesty offer, the large quantities of weapons and fighters taken out of the rebel camps through the amnesty have led many previously sceptical observers to be cautiously optimistic that the government’s efforts may bring a significant reduction in the unrest in the Delta.
This isn’t to say that problems in the oil-producing region have been solved: transforming recent short-term advances into the conditions for long-term peace will involve a number of challenges. For example, the government must deliver on its pledge to retrain and rehabilitate militants who have joined the amnesty scheme.
Furthermore, the administration has promised to implement programmes to train and educate youths in the Delta and help them to establish businesses. These are ambitious goals in a region where infrastructure is poor and private investors are (understandably) wary. To make matters worse, the administration has little time in which to achieve its aims: several young former fighters have already indicated in the media that if the government fails to fulfil its promise to give them jobs to enable them to maintain a legitimate living, they will return to the bush and resume attacking oil pipelines.
Mr Yar’Adua has not so far made public any plan that could create enough new and sustainable jobs for the thousands of jobless former fighters as well as the many more ordinary unemployed youths who are watching to see whether the amnesty programme will lead to real change in the Delta.
What is more, peace cannot be fully achieved until the fundamental political issues underlying the crisis are resolved. Talks between the government and the militants are likely to be dominated by the thorny issue of petroleum revenue sharing between oil states and the rest of Nigeria.
The challenge will be to reach a compromise between the demands of the militants and other Delta nationalists for local control of mineral resources and the federal position that the endowment belongs to the entire nation, and that its benefits must be spread across the country. However, some commentators believe that, having weighed the cost of the disruptions to oil production over the past four years against the material benefits of peace in the region, the government and parliament are probably now more receptive to proposals to increase the proportion of oil revenue paid to oil states.
There have been reports, for example, that President Yar’Adua has offered to allocate 10% of the earnings from Nigeria’s oil joint ventures to Niger Delta residents. This has yet to be confirmed (or discussed with Delta representatives or in parliament), but it is certainly the case that in December 2008 a government committee recommended that oil-derivation payments should be raised from the current 13% to 25%.
Some private-sector organisations have also urged the government to increase oil derivation and offer the Delta region the prospect of further increases in the future as other areas of the federation adjust to changes in Nigerian fiscal federalism, driven by changing political and economic realities.
However, reaching a compromise on restructuring the finances of the federation will not be easy given the heavy dependence on oil revenue of the federal government and almost all Nigerian states (Lagos is a possible exception). If agreement cannot be reached, and if the government is unable to make good on its promises to create jobs in the region, the risk is that violence will flare up again.
Source: Viewswire